An Independent Interim Report Regarding Some Anomalies Within
the Official Crash Investigation of TWA Flight 800
Thomas F. Stalcup
Research Assistant, Department of Physics, Florida State
University, Tallahassee FL 32310 stalcup@magnet.fsu.edu
March 9, 1999
Several anomalies and inconsistencies remain within the official
investigation into the crash of TWA Flight 800 (F800). The
failure of the FBI to identify the closest vehicle (a surface
vessel) to the plane at the time of the crash, the questionable
conclusions drawn from explosive residues found in the wreckage,
the secrecy of eyewitness testimonies, and misleading statements
to the victims family members are among the items discussed
in this report. A pattern of concealment and/or disregard of
crucial pieces of evidence not supporting a preferred
theory of mechanical malfunction is identified. Relevant to the
concerns in this report is the recent Justice Department
Inspector Generals report which found the FBI explosive
unit guilty of, among other things, "scientifically flawed
testimony..[and]..reports." Similar concerns are noted for
both FBI and NTSB officials, groups, and units involved in the
F800 Investigation. The facts in this report should prompt an
independent investigation into the crash of F800 and into the FBI
itself.
Ships in the Vicinity
National Transportation Safety Board radar analysts have
identified the tracks of four surface vessels within a six mile
radius of F800 at the time of the accident. These tracks,
confirmed by the FBI as surface vessels, were detected by the
radar site closest to the crash in Islip, NY. The surface vessel
nearest to the tragedy maintained a 30 knot heading away from the
falling debris and thereby has been named the 30 knot track.
The 30 knot track is a radar tracked surface vessel recorded on
the Islip, Long Island radar.
1.Confirmed a surface vessel by the FBI and NTSB, it was in the
area, later designated as the debris field, moments before debris
began to fall. It left the scene at ~30 knots
(35 mph) rather than assisting with search and rescue.
2.Its position just before F800's breakup is consistent with the
origin of a 'flare' type object which rose from the ocean
surface, according to eyewitnesses.
3.Its speed (30 knots) and direction (away from the accident
scene and land) are inconsistent with the many citizen mariners
who sailed to the area to aid in the search
and rescue effort.
4.To date, this vessel has not been identified by the FBI or NTSB
as stated in the following letter from Lewis D. Schiliro, Acting
Assistant Director in Charge, FBI.
In a July 27, 1998 Letter from Lewis D. Schiliro, Acting
Assistant Director in Charge, FBI, responded to an April letter
to the FBI from Congressman James A Traficant, (D) Ohio.
"
Question 2: In its analysis of radar tapes, has the
FBI been able to positively identify every single aircraft and
surface vessel that was in the proximity of TWA Flight
800 at the time of the accident?
FBI Answer: No
in January, 1997 the FBI first noted the
presence of a surface vessel
between 25 and 35 knots
Despite extensive efforts, the FBI has been unable to
identify this vessel."
The FBI has constantly reminded government officials and the
public that every possible lead has been pursued. Claiming to
have "left no stone unturned..[and]..during the
24-Hour period: 371 vessels identified," the FBI failed to
identify the closest surface vessel to the crash. The identities
of the remaining three vessels, of which the FBI has allegedly
determined, have not been released to the public or the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Explosive Evidence in Wreckage
PETN/RDX
The explosives PETN and RDX were detected and confirmed to exist
by the FBI between rows 15 and 25. Later, however, the FBI stated
that these traces were consistent with
explosives allegedly spilled during a canine training exercise a
few weeks before the crash.
This explosives "spill" was not reported until after
the detection of PETN and RDX within the wreckage of F800, and
the area of the spill was inconsistent with the explosive traces
detected in the wreckage. Officer Burnette of the St. Louis
Police Department, carrying out the bomb sniffing exercise,
failed to record the tail number of the wide body plane in
question, while two such TWA planes existed in close proximity
during the exercise. Burnette testified that he neither saw nor
heard any individuals aboard the plane during the
exercise which ended no earlier than 12:15 PM. The wide body
plane which later flew as TWA Flight 800 left its St. Louis gate
for Honolulu at 12:35 PM, fully catered, with all of its
passengers and crew aboard.
Could officer Burnette neither see or hear any passengers, crew,
or caterers 20 minutes before the plane left its gate? Did
Burnette conduct his exercise on a nearby, nearly identical
TWA 747 which left its gate at 1:30 PM? If Burnette did conduct
his explosive training exercise on the 747 which later flew as
TWA Flight 800, why did the locations of the alleged
spills conflict with the traces detected with the F800 wreckage?
These questions must be answered before any investigating agency
can attribute the PETN and RDX traces found
within the F800 wreckage to the above mentioned spill.
The Red Residue
After noticing a red residue on several (rows 17-19) passenger
seats within the rows in which PETN and RDX were detected, lead
TWA Investigator and Head Pilot Terrel Stacey
brought the residue to the attention of FBI investigators. Weeks
later, the FBI refused to share its laboratory results on the
residue, citing evidence in a criminal investigation,
prompting Stacey to remove samples of this residue, giving them
to James Sanders (author/journalist) who in turn had the residue
tested at West Coast Analytical Services
(WCAS) in Sante Fe Springs, CA. The results of this test showed
high concentrations of elements used in missile fuel and
pyrotechnics. The publication of these results in the
Press Enterprise newspaper of Riverside, California received
national press coverage, prompting the FBI to make a series of
public statements[Official, 1997 #13; Loeb, 1997 #11;
Kallstrom, 1997 #14; FBI, 1997 #15] concerning the residue and
their dissatisfaction with Stacey's and Sanders' actions.
The media attention over the WCAS results influenced the NTSB to
have the residue tested independently at NASAs Materials
Science Division. Based on the NASA results, Dr.
Merrit Birky (Lead Investigator, Fire and Explosions Group, NTSB)
stated that the residue was consistent with the contact adhesive
named in (report 97-IC0154) as Scotch Grip 1357
Contact Adhesive. Upon further inquiry however, it was found that
the NTSB never tested the WCAS samples. Separate samples were
lifted from the wreckage, and most
surprising, no attempt was made by the NTSB to determine by
chemical analysis if these samples were consistent with those
removed by Captain Stacey. Furthermore, FBI chemist
Steve Burmeister, has stated that the red residue was not
consistent with the 3M adhesive tested at NASA.
In essence, the NTSB only proved that TWA used seat adhesive on
its seats, not that the WCAS residue was adhesive. This fact
spurred the independent testing of the 3M
adhesive named in the NTSB report at Florida State University
(FSU). Results from these tests were inconsistent with the WCAS
results and brought to the attention of NTSB Vice
Chairman Francis, who forwarded them to Dr. Birky. The following
excerpt is from a fax to Dr. Birky addressing this issue.
In a fax dated 8/31/98 from Thomas Stalcup, Florida State
University to Dr. Merrit Birky, NTSB:
"What was the purpose of Report 97-IC0154: to verify TWA's
claim that adhesive is used to hold seat fabric together, or was
it to counter the conclusions of James
Sanders? If the latter is the case, then elemental analysis of
the report's samples is necessary. Only after determining the
samples tested in the above report are consistent
with the residue tested by WCAS, can the NTSB assert that this
same residue is consistent with adhesive."
Previous to this fax, Birky was asked a similar question:
8/27/98 phone conversation (TS designates Thomas Stalcup, Florida
State University, MB designates Dr. Merrit Birky, NTSB):
TS: "And I think, ah, it would have been good if you did an
elemental analysis, not to prove whether it was adhesive or not,
but to prove if it's the same stuff, to make sure
that you and Sanders had the same stuff, therefore you say the
red residue is adhesive, you mean that it's the same residue
Sanders is talking about."
MB: "
to try to prove that we have the same samples as
Sanders, I'm not sure it gets us very far. Supposing you come out
differently, then what are going to say? Well,
youre not going to put the thing to bed."
The necessary tests to determine consistency between the NTSB and
WCAS residue have yet to be performed, and whether or not they
"come out differently" should be of no
consequence. If the NTSB carried out appropriate tests to
determine that their samples were consistent with the WCAS
results, the claim that adhesive was the source of the
WCAS residue would have been scientifically valid. However, the
NTSB put science aside in order "to put the thing to
bed," and any claim that the WCAS residue is adhesive has
no scientific basis. The FSU tests exclude the 3M adhesive as a
possible source, which leaves the question of the residue's
origin an item for debate two years after the crash.
Nitrates
A piece of the aircraft's center wing tank (labeled CW-504 during
reconstruction) was sent to NASA for chemical analysis by the
NTSB. On it was a strange residue in a "splatter"
pattern. Test results concluded the presence of nitrates in this
residue, alarming NASA scientist Charles W. Bassett, as nitrates
may indicate the presence of explosives.
Ammonium-Nitrate (the explosive used in the Oklahoma City bomb),
for example, is one of the many nitrate based explosives.
To chemists, nitrates are known as anions, and when
combined with cations, the resultant molecule is
explosive. If Ammonia (a cation) was detected in the splatter
pattern, a
strong case could be made for Ammonium-nitrate as the origin of
the nitrates. Therefore, when investigators determine the
presence of an anion, the next step is to look for a cation
within the same material.
Bassett reported the nitrate (anion) presence in CW-504 to Dr.
Merrit Birky and concluded in report 97-1C0063:
"An attempt to determine the origin of the anions present in
both samples was not conducted at this time but is of concern and
is under further investigation."
However, instead of requesting that Bassett determine the
nitrate's possible explosive identity, Birky sent other aircraft
parts for testing which lacked the questionable residue. No
further testing of CW-504 was requested, the source of the
nitrates was not determined, and Bassett's report, quoted above,
was never released to the public.
The materials sent to Bassett after the nitrate report were parts
from the planes air conditioning units. Birky instructed
Bassett to determine whether these parts could have
possibly been the source of the splatter pattern on CW-504.
Bassett concluded in report 97-1C0089 that:
"there is no indication that any of the reference materials
examined in these analyses, served as the source of the
surfactant coated polyester which was discussed in
report 97-1C0064
nor is there evidence to indicate any of
the reference materials served as the source of the nitrate
presence in [CW-504]."
Less than a month prior, a seemingly redundant report comparing
air conditioning materials to the CW-504 splatter pattern by the
FBI appears to conflict with Bassetts conclusion,
and makes no mention of any nitrate presence. Here, in a vague
summary, the FBI concludes:
"Based upon the comparison examinations conducted, specimens
[CWT splatter material] are consistent with having originated
from the sources represented by [foam
air duct material], or a similar source."
The FBIs failure to identify the nitrate presence within
the CW-504 spatter pattern is disturbing given that two of the
three theories for the crash included the possibility of a
nitrate-related explosion. The NTSBs detection of nitrates
on CW-504 should have prompted further testing of the splatter
pattern. Chemical tests available for determining a
possible explosive source of the material were never utilized.
Instead, other parts of the aircraft were tested in apparent
disregard to the possibility that the spatter pattern may have
been evidence of an explosive material.
The FBI's Inconsistent Statements to Family Members
In November 1997, the FBI suspended their investigation into F800
in a nationally televised press conference, wherein a dramatic
CIA produced animation simulating the official
crash sequence was shown to explain the alleged missile
sightings. Shortly after this press conference, FBI Assistant
Director, James Kallstrom addressed some of the family
members concerning the eyewitnesses and their alleged responses
to the CIA animation. Kallstrom's statements to family members
implied that some eyewitnesses were not
credible and a remaining 244, retained as credible, thought the
CIA animation was plausible. Jose Cremades (President, Victims of
Flight 800) relayed Kallstroms statements in a
letter dated December 3, 1997.
Excerpt from a 12/3/97 letter from Jose Cremades:
"Mr. Kallstrom of the FBI has told me that the 244 witnesses
retained as 'credible' by the FBI have found the CIA video
plausible."
However, in September 1998, Kallstrom states that all
eyewitnesses were credible, the number 244 represents them, and
that they never screened the CIA animation.
Excerpt from an interview with James Kallstrom (TS designates
Thomas Stalcup, and JK, James Kallstrom):
TS: Those [244] were the credible, or were those maintained as
credible
.were there some that weren't, above the number?
JK: No
they were all credible...
TS: And you never asked them what they thought of the CIA video?
JK: No
Kallstrom now denies ever having the CIA animation screened by
any eyewitnesses. His statement to family members that
eyewitnesses "have found the CIA video plausible" is
deceitful and contradicts reality.
Also in the 12/3/97 letter, Cremades stated:
"The FBI has also told me and other family members that
those [who thought they saw a missile] witnesses agreed that, if
they did not see the aircraft AND the missile as
two distinct objects, they must have seen only the aircraft, the
latter being much larger than any conceivable missile."
Eyewitnesses disagreed:
After informing witness Darrel Miron of Mr. Cremades quote above,
he replied:
(12/3/97 phone interview[Stalcup, 1997 #26]): "That's total
fabrication."
After informing witness Paul Runyan of the same quote, he
replied:
(12/4/97 phone interview[Stalcup, 1997 #27]): "Yeah right,
coming off the water."
(12/6/97 phone interview[Stalcup, 1997 #27]): "Would fuel
burn from the [ocean] surface going up, or from the plane coming
down
.What I saw was going up from the
surface
like a rising flare."
Witness Major Fred Meyers responding to a similar question:
(11/24/97 radio interview): "Well that's pure
fabrication...What's going on in the FBI, I don't know."
Witness Richard Goss responding to a similar question:
(11/24/97 radio interview): "I can't see that's possible at
all
[the CIA animation] was a joke."
The major question in the heads of the family members, news
media, and concerned citizens about the crash of F800 is what the
eyewitnesses saw. Many were reported to have
seen an object streak toward the aircraft before any explosions.
James Kallstrom's statements to the family members were nothing
less than misleading. Stating that the
eyewitnesses agreed with the CIA animation implied that they
agreed with the FBI conclusions or at least commented on the
animation. However, no eyewitness was asked about
the animation and of the over 100 individuals who witnessed the
streaking object, an overwhelming majority disagree with the
official crash sequence and the CIA video.
Note: Independent triangulation of eyewitness accounts has
determined the origin of at least one high speed projectile to be
over two miles lower in altitude and nearly
seven miles north of F800. This object's trajectory, according to
eyewitnesses, ended at the aircraft with a brilliant white flash.
The FBI's Influence on the NTSB Baltimore Hearings
The NTSB Public Hearings into F800 were scheduled to begin on
December 8, 1997 in Baltimore Maryland. As a forum for discussing
all facets of the NTSB's investigation,
hundreds of pages of documents, culminating from months of
investigative effort were slated for release. Among these
documents were the test results of explosive
residues and eyewitness reports. However, a few days before the
hearings the FBI drafted a letter to NTSB Chairman Jim Hall which
effectively banned these items from the
hearings.
December 3, 1997 (five days before the NTSB Baltimore hearings),
FBI Assistant Director James Kallstrom sent a letter to NTSB
Chairman Hall. An excerpt from this
document is reproduced below.
"
Set forth below are the specific parts of the
hearing, as set forth in the 11/29/97 5:56 AM draft Witness list,
to which we [FBI] object and the bases for our
objections.
Review of Witness Statements Panel
the FBI
objects to requests to disclose or include in
the public docket of any FBI FD-302s or summaries of FD-302s
prepared by the NTSB that report the
results of any interviews or reinterviews of the 244 eyewitnesses
whose reports were examined by the CIA in connection with it's
analysis and to calling any
eyewitnesses to testify at the public hearing
Investigation For Missile/Warhead Impact/Bombs/Explosives;
Residue Examination (exhibit 20I); PETN Findings, Small Explosive
Charges
we particularly object to discussion of the residue
examination and the use of exhibit 20I, an FBI Laboratory report
on the chemical analysis of the residue
found on the seats."
In an unprecedented maneuver less than a week before the
hearings, the FBI successfully banned all eyewitness testimony
and physical evidence in support of a bomb or
missile from the Baltimore hearings. Certain witnesses, however,
in support of mechanical malfunction as the cause were cleared by
the FBI as the letter includes:
"we do not object to the use of and inclusion in the public
docket of summaries prepared by NTSB of FBI interviews of other
individuals to the extent their
information may relate to mechanical or similar issues."
The FBI's apparent need for secrecy effectively restricted from
public debate any crash scenarios in conflict with their own. The
absence of laboratory results of explosive
residues from the public docket placed total reliance on an FBI
Crime Lab with a history of inadequate scientific checks and
balances. More disturbing is the fact that the
FBI Explosives Unit (EU) involved in the F800 explosive residue
testing was the unit most scrutinized by the Inspector General of
the United States Justice Department:
"[The Inspector Generals Office has] identified
several cases in which examiners within the EU had testified
outside their expertise, testified inaccurately or
ambiguously, or stated opinions that are scientifically
unsupportable."
The secrecy involving the FBIs investigation into F800 is
unwarranted and does little to dispel doubt over the EUs
and other FBI units performance. While referred to
repeatedly as showing no evidence of a criminal act, explosive
test results were peculiarly absent and their discussion stricken
from the NTSB public hearings. While
assuring victims family members that the eyewitnesses agree
with the FBI conclusions, those eyewitnesses were never allowed
to speak nor their reports discussed at the
hearings. Lacking eyewitnesses and their respective reports, what
hundreds of individuals witnessed had to be re-created in their
absence and without their input. The
FBI/NTSB conclusions remained hollow, as public scrutiny and peer
review of key segments of the investigation were avoided by their
concealment from the hearings and
the public.
Conclusion
The FBI and NTSB conducted incomplete testing of crucial pieces
of evidence, with contradictions between agencies. Both agencies
have failed to identify the nearest
surface vessel to the tragedy. Victims family members have
been misled by top FBI officials. Eyewitness reports have been
inaccurately portrayed by FBI officials and a
CIA produced animation. At least one key NTSB official finds it
more important to "put the thing to bed" than to
conduct a scientifically sound investigation.
Most of the NTSBs investigative efforts are available to
the public. However, due to FBI pressures, important parts of the
investigation have not been released. Curiously,
these parts are those which may contradict the official theory of
the investigation, and their absence allows suspicions of a
cover-up to continue. Release of these important
results could quell any of the legitimate or unfounded
suspicions.
In order for the FBI to regain the trust of the American public,
it must release the details of its investigation into the crash
of F800 for independent oversight. These
thoughts, shared by many citizens, are well summed by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers before the
Judiciary Committee, United States House of
Representatives; Subcommittee on Crime in the wake of the
USJD/OIG Special Report into the FBIs Explosives-Related
Misconduct :
"We speak from a non-governmental perspective about the
importance of restoring integrity to, and citizen confidence in
the FBI lab
Among the IG's most
troubling findings are the following types of folly and
wrongdoing.
Scientifically flawed and inaccurate testimony.
Testimony beyond the examiner's expertise.
Outright fabrication of test results.
Tampering with lab reports.
Inadequate or nonexistent record-keeping and test result
documentation.
Unqualified examiners, with little training and little or no
formal education in their assigned areas of expertise.
Failure by management to resolve serious and credible allegations
of incompetence.
These cases confirm that the FBI lab needs ongoing and
expanded, neutral oversight and overhaul. They demonstrate what
an unstinting effort it will take to
discover and undo the long-lasting damage brought on by the lab's
culture of dishonesty and sloppiness
Lack in public confidence in the FBI Laboratories has real and
serious implications. The secrecy surrounding the investigation
of F800 does little to help alleviate this
discontent. A greater public good is served by releasing the
details of the FBIs investigation and achieving faith in
the FBI laboratories than the "FBI's concerns regarding
making public the results of a criminal investigation." The
crash of F800 is still unresolved. This report has addressed
significant anomalies that need independent review.
Recommendations
1.That the FBI release to the public all details of its
investigation into F800.
2.That the NTSB test the CW-504 splatter pattern for the
existence of cations.
3.That the NTSB conduct elemental analysis on each sample named
in the NASA report 97-IC0154, and publicly release the results.
4.That the FBI and CIA release all data (including the complete
eyewitness data) used in the CIA produced animation describing
F800s final minute of flight.
5.That an NTSB public hearing is scheduled which contains the
release of all eyewitness reports and allows the testimony of the
eyewitnesses. This hearing should
also release and discuss all explosives related test results and
documents related to the tragedy.
6.That the NTSB conduct independent interviews with the
eyewitnesses to gain bearing line data to all objects observed.
7.That the FBI release the identities of the three surface
vessels closest to the crash and list the vessels reason(s)
for not assisting in search and rescue.
8.That the FBI and NTSB allow independent testing of all
explosives related wreckage.
9.That the FBI test for explosive traces on wreckage items
consistent with an alleged spill during a bomb training exercise
conducted on June 10, 1996 at St. Louis Intl
Airport.
10.That the recommendations of the Justice Departments
Inspector Generals report be implemented fully and rapidly.
11.That Congress hold hearings into the Official Investigation of
TWA Flight 800.
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