

EXHIBIT 10 - ELECTRICAL POWER FAILURE AND INSTRUMENT READINGS

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- 1) Instruments that are driven by geared miniature electrical motors such as the pilots and copilots electric altimeters, fuel quantity gauges, etc, provide the crash investigator a snapshot of exactly what some of the aircraft conditions were at power failure. These instruments freeze at power failure and generally can be relied upon to hold that reading through crash impacts.
- 2) The pilot's and copilot's electric altimeter was found in the Debris Field reading 13,800 ft. and the copilot's 13,820 ft, so we know the power didn't fail until the aircraft climbed to or above 13,800 ft.
- 3) Based on the rate of climb recorded on the DFDR, TWA FL800 would not have reached 13,800 ft. prior to 20:31:13.15 seconds.
- 4) Based on the TWA FL800 Transponder radio transmission recorded by Mega Data Systems, Inc. of Long Island at 20:31:13 that showed an IFF Mode C (altitude) readout of 13,800 ft, we know power was on in the aircraft 13 seconds after the minute and the altitude data exactly agree with rate of climb calculations and the Debris Field forensic evidence.
- 5) Unfortunately, once we pointed out to the NTSB the data recorded on the 20:31:12 line of the DFDR clearly showed an explosion external to the aircraft, they rather sophomorically denied their own printed data, crossed it out and removed it from the Internet record.
- 6) A detonation of high explosive, forward, low left, would cause the aircraft to pitch and yaw violently disrupting normal airflow to the engines. The explosive shock wave would further disrupt the flow causing gross compressor stalls. The fuel control sensing no burner pressure in the engine would immediately cut the fuel and the engine bleed valves would open. Followed by flame-out.
- 7) When an engine flames out, its electrical generator will remain on-line until the engine rpm decays below the governing range of the generators constant speed drive. At that time, under-voltage/frequency protection circuits will trip the generator off-line. In other words, electrical power will fail in about one second after flameout. In this case at approximately 20:31:13.
- 8) These are extremely important points because the NTSB's theory and the CIA "cartoon" requires the engines to be providing thrust after the cockpit separated from the remaining aircraft.
- 9) Fuel tank quantity gauges were also found in the Debris Field. They show readings for right wing tanks with about 8,000 pounds more fuel than the left wing tanks. They also show the center wing tank mysteriously doubling in fuel quantity from the three hundred pound gauge reading at takeoff. In addition, 2,000 lbs. of fuel was missing in the #2 main tank.
- 10) There are four ways an 8,000 lb. asymmetrical difference in wing tank readings at power failure could occur:
 - a) Tanks were fueled asymmetrically at takeoff. (Fueling error)
 - b) Fuel leaked from the left wing. (holes in left tanks)
 - c) All engines feeding from left tanks.
 - d) Aircraft was rolled right. (Down wing tanks will read higher than actual fuel and high wing tanks normally read less fuel) See Captain Howard Mann's evaluation at Exhibit 1 on page 40.

- 11) There is no evidence showing a fueling error or a pilot induced cross-feed error. This leaves two alternatives as the cause, right wing down and fuel leaks in left wing.
- 12) There is forensic evidence to support both conditions and both conditions firmly support a warhead airburst detonation, low left side forward. The aircraft would pitch up, roll right and suffer a hydraulic RAM overpressure in the left wing tanks. See Exhibit 7 on page 47. Failure of the center wing tank, left side wall, from hydraulic RAM pressure (common wall with the number two main tank) explains the doubling of the CWT fuel reading fuel having entered from the #2 main tank.
- 13) Because the right wing tanks show more fuel in the tanks than they should have, it is clear the aircraft was in a Right Bank at power failure.
- 14) It is also highly probable the left wing tank's reading, showing less fuel than they should have, was the net product of the right wing down roll, loss of fuel to the atmosphere, venting out of the upper wing skin fractures over all three tanks, and loss through cracks between the number two main tank and the center wing tank.
- 15) When fuel vents into the atmosphere at FL800's airspeed, it atomizes and forms a tubular white cloud until it dissipates. Military tactical pilots occasionally will dump a small amount of fuel to enable a separated wingman to visually acquire the flight leader beyond normal visual range. That cloud was seen by and preserved in a sketch by Mr. Angelides.
- 16) In summary, instrument readings recovered as forensic evidence from the debris and radio transmissions received by Mega Data Systems, Inc. PROVE:
 - a) The electrical power was on until at least 20:31:13.15 validating the recording of the DFDR 12-second line.
 - b) That, at power failure, the aircraft had rolled right.
 - c) That at power failure, the center wing tank had gained fuel.
 - d) That at power failure, the left wing was leaking fuel into the atmosphere.
 - e) That engine flameout sequence and timing exactly fit the anti-aircraft weapon airburst scenario.