

EXHIBIT 18 - A CRITICAL FBI ASSUMPTION ERROR

“A Large Anti-aircraft Missile Requires a Large Ship Launch Platform”

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Because the damage in evidence on TWA FL800 indicates a large, airburst warhead was involved, the actual launch requirements for such a missile are important to determine if such a missile was used. In conversations with FBI officials I strongly suggested they take a very careful look at Full Sized Anti-aircraft missile systems.

The Iranian AIM 54A was specifically suggested because of its self contained guidance system (it carries its own radar), it's relatively easy adaptability to be fired from surface boats, as well as its lethal 127 lb. Airburst warhead. Unfortunately, Mr. Kalstrom and the FBI's position was to totally ignore these large systems based at least publicly on the idea that large weapons would need a warship, its radar, launch rail infrastructure, etc. to launch and guide a powerful weapon.

This is absolutely false, virtually any solid fuel anti-aircraft missile could be launched and successfully guided to TWA FL800 from a boat or small floating container. On 8 January 1998, Admiral Thomas Moorer, who attended the AIM Press Conference about TWA FL800, personally chided a reporter who insisted no one saw a ship, so it couldn't have been a missile. (This was despite the fact Islip, NY radar did record highly suspicious surface contacts that are still unidentified at the missile firing points). The Admiral, who in his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was responsible for the development of many of America's current weapon systems, pointed to the “Attack Missile” concept. The attack missile, simply defined, was a missile in a watertight can that once dropped in enemy waters, floated level with the surface, would anchor itself and could be activated by timer or remote control to passively sense, then launch on enemy aircraft.

Actual Guidance Requirements

In the myriad worlds of missile guidance technology, the various systems can be broken down by types. Optically Guided, Radar Guided, Radar Semi-active Seeker, Laser Seeker, Heat (IR) Seeker, and Home on Jam or Radio Signal Seeker, etc.

It should be carefully noted that anti-aircraft systems are designed to destroy high performance military aircraft. These aircraft have their own designed defense suite; maneuverability, electronic deceivers and jammers, decoy metal chaff, and decoy flares for protection. Because of the electronic deceivers and jammers on military aircraft, missile designers have employed a particularly nasty little device, the Home on Jam or Radio Source Seeker Head.

Once launched, a tracking missile so equipped senses an intense transmission on it's radar guidance frequency(s) (jamming) it simply shifts to Home on the transmitting (jamming) antenna. A radio frequency seeker head can be modified to seek a specific frequency or bandwidth of radio transmissions.

Any missile launched and equipped with a Home on Jam Seeker head, set on the frequency of the Hampton VOR, would guide on the VOR DME Antenna and destroy TWA FL800 as it passed by.

The reason this would happen is because the VOR navigation transceivers on commercial aircraft transmit a continuous ranging signal to whatever VOR navigation station the pilots have tuned-in. In the case of TWA FL800, it was the Hampton VOR. The radio signal from the aircraft is normally received by the ground VOR and retransmitted back to the aircraft. The distance measuring equipment (DME) in the aircraft measures the distance to the VOR station electronically and displays the information in the cockpit.

Military ships and aircraft that enter combat zones or find themselves taken under missile fire, will immediately stop transmitting on all frequencies for the very reasons cited above. In the case of TWA FL800, once launched, the missile's radio seeker head, sensing the aircraft's VOR transmissions, would fly toward the aircraft's VOR antenna until it closed to a preset proximity detonation point.

The number one and number 2 VOR DME antennas are located on the belly of the aircraft, almost precisely where the detonating warhead shock wave first impacted the aircraft. See diagram below. Missile number one detonated abeam the number one VOR DME antenna, nine feet below the aircraft and 20 feet out to the left.

It is this investigator's professional opinion, because of the aircraft's length, the low probability that the maximum damage pattern would occur at the DME antenna locations randomly, as well as eyewitness descriptions of the missile flight, that there is a very high probability the missiles used to ambush and destroy TWA FL800 were Passive Radio Transmission Seekers.

It should be pointed out, the guidance system described above is essentially a low technology stealth weapon, perfect for a terrorist or paramilitary surrogate of a rogue state. Because it is totally passive, no radar or other illumination of the target is required by the shooter, he need only see the target and launch the weapon locally or remotely. Also, because it is passive, there are no telltale electronic signatures coming from the shooter or the weapon to be received by US military sensors.

Had the White House assigned Department of Defense investigators instead of FBI Agents to this task, I am confident such as gross assumption error about missiles would have been avoided.




Diagram of Aircraft Antenna Locations – Boeing 747-100