Re: It looks like you have been suckered by the silly accusations made about Elmer

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Posted by J L DONOVAN on September 02, 19100 at 12:42:36:

In Reply to: It looks like you have been suckered by the silly accusations made about Elmer posted by Ron on August 31, 19100 at 19:01:06:

DID YOU NOTICE AT HEARING IF THE B747 WIRING DIAGRAM WAS IN FACT THE CORRECT ON? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT. THANKS FOR ALL YOUR INPUT AND DESIRE TO CORRECT MANY "WRONGS". JUNE
: From you reference to "Elmer's theory" I suspect you have been suckered by the silly accusations here that he's also the author of the cargo door theory. He's not. John Barry Smith is and anyone can see see at a glance their writing styles are completely different. Smith doesn't post here but does elsewhere and here's the letter he sent to the NTSB after the hearing. Ron

: For NTSB: Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000

: Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter

: You have done an extensive investigative job on TWA 800; extensive and expensive but not complete. You have prosecuted the center tank explosion as the initial event. You have defended your probable cause from missile or meteor or electromagnetic or bomb. But you have not defended it properly from wiring/cargo door explanation. You essentially offer the wiring/center tank explanation for TWA 800 which is refuted by photographic evidence of dark soot and suddenly non-soot whiteness on upper fuselage and smooth port and shattered starboard side just forward of the wing of TWA 800 reconstruction. A center tank explosion would do centered spherical sooting and shattering. The evidence shows unilateral starboard damage and a sudden break of the fuselage with no fire on one side. You have no ignition source after trying God with static electricity, pump manufacturer, and now mechanics drilling and not removing shavings.

: Wiring/center tank explosion is not the initial event.

: Wiring/cargo door is. The photographic evidence shows the shattered door and the outward ruptures at midspan latches. The ignition source for later center tank fire/explosion is the on fire engine number three, fodded because it is closest to the forward cargo door and would ingest foreign objects and catch fire should that door open or rupture in flight, as happened in UAL 811.

: Well, the sound of the CVR and the visual of the wreckage all support wiring/cargo door, and yet, no investigation other than checking eight of ten latches of which there are twenty on that Boeing 747 in two identical cargo doors.

: All latched and locked and door intact at water impact? Whose opinion is that? Certainly not an aircraft accident investigator. That sounds like a metallurgist's opinion. Is it? Well, it's wrong. The door was shattered up high and the bottom eight latches of ten available may have been latched and locked at water impact but the midspan latches were long gone.

: So, why was not the wiring/cargo door explanation given as much official attention and investigation as the wacky bomb, missile, EMG, and meteor explanations? Wiring/cargo door has happened before in similar type aircraft under similar conditions leaving similar forensic evidence on metal, tape, and paint and should have had priority.

: So, after Senator John McCain personally asked Chairman Hall to discuss with me the wiring/cargo door explanation, and Chairman Hall declined, I have come to the conclusion that you are all ducking me, refusing to think, refusing to talk, refusing to listen, refusing to consider wiring/cargo door explanation. Is it because it leads to PA 103 and AI 182? Is it because it was NIH, not invented here, syndrome? Is it because you hate to admit you were wrong, even about small things? Is it fear? Fear that the wiring/cargo door explanation is correct and the implications are perceived as dire? Dire to who?

: It's dire to passengers and crew if you're wrong, NTSB, and wiring pops a door...again, and again. It's dire to the manufacturer if it is shown that aging wiring is a problem in airliners. Wait, that's been done already by NTSB. There is nothing to fear anymore. The main problem has been identified: Aging wiring in aging aircraft.

: On many main items we agree on TWA 800:

: You say mechanical; I say so too
: You say aging wiring is problem; I say so too.
: Initial event is wiring short, I say so too.
: You say catastrophic; I say so too.
: You say no bomb or missile or meteor or electromagnetic interference; I say so too.

: Only in details do we disagree:

: Your suspect wiring is just aft of the wing leading edge and mine is just forward.
: Initial event after wiring short is cargo door rupture and not spontaneous center tank explosion.
: Center tank exploded later, ignited by on fire engine number three.
: Nose came off after huge hole on starboard side appeared just forward of wing, (see NTSB photograph for shattered area.)

: Streak is piece or pieces of door area of shiny metal reflecting evening orange sunlight to observers on ground as they spin away after explosive decompression.
: Place of explosive decompression is the two midspan latches of forward cargo door, (see photos of midspan latches showing outward open petal rupture. )
: http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html
: http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html

: Photo above shows a door that was not intact and latched at water impact but shattered and ruptured at midspan latches early on.

: We are close in probable cause, but far enough away so that the suspect forward wiring is still there and not yet inspected and replaced if necessary when cracked, chafed, or worn to bare wire, as Poly X is wont to do.

: Curious that, wiring was inspected in cargo doors of MD 11, fuel tanks of 747s, but not cargo doors of 747s, although cargo doors have opened in both designs but only the Boeing 747 has confirmed wiring/switch problems.

: But, what now? Well, wait for another one to fall down I assume. 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1996 are the years of open cargo door in flight events for high time Boeing 747s that I am tracking. It's now 2000.

: We will all know at the same time the cause of the next wiring/cargo door event because it will follow such a predictable pattern:

: Sudden loud sound on the CVR not matched to bomb but matched to explosive decompression. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Sudden power cut off to FDR and secondary transponder. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) More inflight damage on the right side of aircraft. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Forward cargo door found in pieces, aft door intact and latched. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Front section will be torn off from aft section. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Engine 3 fodded. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Damage start location in or near forward cargo hold. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) At least nine never recovered bodies of passengers and crew. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Wreckage plot areas will be front section, aft section, and engines with number three engine apart from other three. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Possible streak of departing door if sun angle and observers is aligned. (Just like TWA 800.) Aircraft will be a high time Boeing 747. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.)

: So, Gentlemen entrusted with the public safety in aviation, you have not properly ruled out open cargo door inflight for TWA 800 because you have refused to discuss the explanation with the leading advocate and discoverer of it, that's me, as well as not having the required evidence such as a smooth cargo door and all ten latches to substantiate your reason for ruling it out as:

: Dr. Loeb of NTSB: "We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact."

: That statement above is absolutely false, full of errors, and a wrong conclusion. All claims are refuted by official documents and photographs which were emailed to you yesterday.

: Until you talk to me, you have not done your job of a complete aircraft accident investigation for TWA 800. And you know it after these long four years and hundreds of emails from me filled with facts such as analysis attached. I've included the analysis below to refute any accusation of weirdness, lack of research, faulty reasoning, and inaccuracy of facts presented by me. I'm not a missile guy or a bomb guy nor any conspiracy person. I'm the reasonable aviator who has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet crash and is saying that for several Boeing 747s, an event that happened before has happened again for TWA 800 and supports that plausible claim with extensive facts, data, and evidence.

: Until you face, consider, and thoroughly investigate the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800, you have failed. You have failed your duty as public safety officials to whom media, manufacturers, and citizens look toward for a complete investigation. You did not do a complete investigation. You did a specialized prosecution of center tank explosion. The wiring/cargo door explanation is still there, waiting for examination. And you know it. One exhibitin the Public docket and a sentence at a public hearing is not a complete investigation of a cause initially thought to the answer, forward cargo door opened in flight and ruled out within days based upon cursory examination of some but not all of the latches and some but not all of the cargo door.

: I again challenge you, as NTSB officials, as public safety officials, to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 by interacting with the proponent, the one who knows the most about it. If your mind is changed in some areas, then the better for it; if not changed, then you may rest that you have done a complete job of investigation and the better for it also.

: Sincerely,

: John Barry Smith
: (831) 659-3552 phone
: 551 Country Club Drive,
: Carmel Valley, CA 93924
: www.corazon.com
: barry@corazon.com
: Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
: US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
: US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
: Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
: Retired US Army Major MSC
: Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
: Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

: NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

: Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996."

: Analysis by JBS>
: 1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine teardown facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton.

: 2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. A forensic powerplant teardown is likely to require several man hundred hours per engine with several thousand hours of metallographic back up work. Additionally many specialized tools are required to do this. There should be many thousands of feet of tape or pictures. Haste is evident in a one day teardown per engine in an empty hangar with only one engine specialist present.

: Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine (HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

: Analysis by JBS>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in this same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in this report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing and irregular FDR EPR readings.

: Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples which are mainly irrelevant in a discussion about engines and teardown results. 33% of engine report is not about engines but about favored NTSB explanation of center tank fuel explosion as initial event.

: Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

: Analysis by JBS>Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all' of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight.

: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

: Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball.

: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame.

: The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL

: The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

: Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears.

: The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals.

: It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

: The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

: This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.

: Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

: The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

: The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

: The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

: The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

: The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

: The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

: The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces.
: Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report.
: "RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting
: RF3A-H These pieces are part of the
: forward main cargo door.
: Some have grimy corrosion
: inhibiting compound (CIC), but
: there is no apparent sooting.
: These pieces are part of the
: forward main cargo door.
: Some have grimy corrosion
: inhibiting compound (CIC), but
: there is no apparent sooting.
: RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting
: RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting
: RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting
: RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting
: RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting
: RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting
: RF8A No sooting No sooting
: RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting
: RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting
: RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting
: RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting
: RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting
: RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting
: RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting
: RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting"

: NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

: Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at
: and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

: The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

: The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

: NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

: The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

: The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

: Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

: 1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
: 2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
: 3. inward crush top of cargo door
: 4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
: 5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
: 6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
: 7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
: 8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
: 9. hoop stresses found
: 10. CVR sudden loud sound
: 11. FDR abrupt power cut
: 12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
: 13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
: 14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
: 15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
: 16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
: 17. starboard side more damaged than port side
: 18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
: 19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
: 20. section 41 is known to be weak
: 21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
: 22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
: 23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
: 24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
: 25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
: 26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
: 27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
: 28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
: 29. initially thought to be a bomb
: 30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
: 31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
: 32. no soot on maintenance hatch
: 33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
: 34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
: 35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
: 36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
: 37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
: 38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
: 39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
: 40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
: 41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
: 42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
: 43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
: 44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
: 45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
: 46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
: 47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
: 48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
: 49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
: 50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

: Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
: 1. water in forward cargo bay.
: 2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
: 3. electrical short occurs.
: 4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
: 5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
: 6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
: 7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
: 8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
: 9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
: 10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
: 11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
: 12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
: 13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
: 14. fireball observed on the ground.
: 15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

: Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800

: John Barry Smith

: 11 Jan 98

: Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff from hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch.

: The nine foot by nine foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. Fuselage skin was torn vertically. The door fractured and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.

: The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.
: At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.

: The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.

: The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.

: The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast directly, leaving a wide debris field.

: Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris.

: Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.
: Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.

: Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

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: DID YOU NOTICE AT HEARING IF THE B747 WIRING DIAGRAM WAS IN FACT THE CORRECT ON? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT. THANKS FOR ALL YOUR INPUT AND DESIRE TO CORRECT MANY "WRONGS". JUNE : : From you reference to "Elmer's theory" I suspect you have been suckered by the silly accusations here that he's also the author of the cargo door theory. He's not. John Barry Smith is and anyone can see see at a glance their writing styles are completely different. Smith doesn't post here but does elsewhere and here's the letter he sent to the NTSB after the hearing. Ron : : : For NTSB: Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000 : : Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter : : You have done an extensive investigative job on TWA 800; extensive and expensive but not complete. You have prosecuted the center tank explosion as the initial event. You have defended your probable cause from missile or meteor or electromagnetic or bomb. But you have not defended it properly from wiring/cargo door explanation. You essentially offer the wiring/center tank explanation for TWA 800 which is refuted by photographic evidence of dark soot and suddenly non-soot whiteness on upper fuselage and smooth port and shattered starboard side just forward of the wing of TWA 800 reconstruction. A center tank explosion would do centered spherical sooting and shattering. The evidence shows unilateral starboard damage and a sudden break of the fuselage with no fire on one side. You have no ignition source after trying God with static electricity, pump manufacturer, and now mechanics drilling and not removing shavings. : : Wiring/center tank explosion is not the initial event. : : Wiring/cargo door is. The photographic evidence shows the shattered door and the outward ruptures at midspan latches. The ignition source for later center tank fire/explosion is the on fire engine number three, fodded because it is closest to the forward cargo door and would ingest foreign objects and catch fire should that door open or rupture in flight, as happened in UAL 811. : : Well, the sound of the CVR and the visual of the wreckage all support wiring/cargo door, and yet, no investigation other than checking eight of ten latches of which there are twenty on that Boeing 747 in two identical cargo doors. : : All latched and locked and door intact at water impact? Whose opinion is that? Certainly not an aircraft accident investigator. That sounds like a metallurgist's opinion. Is it? Well, it's wrong. The door was shattered up high and the bottom eight latches of ten available may have been latched and locked at water impact but the midspan latches were long gone. : : So, why was not the wiring/cargo door explanation given as much official attention and investigation as the wacky bomb, missile, EMG, and meteor explanations? Wiring/cargo door has happened before in similar type aircraft under similar conditions leaving similar forensic evidence on metal, tape, and paint and should have had priority. : : So, after Senator John McCain personally asked Chairman Hall to discuss with me the wiring/cargo door explanation, and Chairman Hall declined, I have come to the conclusion that you are all ducking me, refusing to think, refusing to talk, refusing to listen, refusing to consider wiring/cargo door explanation. Is it because it leads to PA 103 and AI 182? Is it because it was NIH, not invented here, syndrome? Is it because you hate to admit you were wrong, even about small things? Is it fear? Fear that the wiring/cargo door explanation is correct and the implications are perceived as dire? Dire to who? : : It's dire to passengers and crew if you're wrong, NTSB, and wiring pops a door...again, and again. It's dire to the manufacturer if it is shown that aging wiring is a problem in airliners. Wait, that's been done already by NTSB. There is nothing to fear anymore. The main problem has been identified: Aging wiring in aging aircraft. : : On many main items we agree on TWA 800: : : You say mechanical; I say so too : : You say aging wiring is problem; I say so too. : : Initial event is wiring short, I say so too. : : You say catastrophic; I say so too. : : You say no bomb or missile or meteor or electromagnetic interference; I say so too. : : Only in details do we disagree: : : Your suspect wiring is just aft of the wing leading edge and mine is just forward. : : Initial event after wiring short is cargo door rupture and not spontaneous center tank explosion. : : Center tank exploded later, ignited by on fire engine number three. : : Nose came off after huge hole on starboard side appeared just forward of wing, (see NTSB photograph for shattered area.) : : Streak is piece or pieces of door area of shiny metal reflecting evening orange sunlight to observers on ground as they spin away after explosive decompression. : : Place of explosive decompression is the two midspan latches of forward cargo door, (see photos of midspan latches showing outward open petal rupture. ) : : http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html : : http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html : : Photo above shows a door that was not intact and latched at water impact but shattered and ruptured at midspan latches early on. : : We are close in probable cause, but far enough away so that the suspect forward wiring is still there and not yet inspected and replaced if necessary when cracked, chafed, or worn to bare wire, as Poly X is wont to do. : : Curious that, wiring was inspected in cargo doors of MD 11, fuel tanks of 747s, but not cargo doors of 747s, although cargo doors have opened in both designs but only the Boeing 747 has confirmed wiring/switch problems. : : But, what now? Well, wait for another one to fall down I assume. 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1996 are the years of open cargo door in flight events for high time Boeing 747s that I am tracking. It's now 2000. : : We will all know at the same time the cause of the next wiring/cargo door event because it will follow such a predictable pattern: : : Sudden loud sound on the CVR not matched to bomb but matched to explosive decompression. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Sudden power cut off to FDR and secondary transponder. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) More inflight damage on the right side of aircraft. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Forward cargo door found in pieces, aft door intact and latched. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Front section will be torn off from aft section. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Engine 3 fodded. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Damage start location in or near forward cargo hold. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) At least nine never recovered bodies of passengers and crew. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Wreckage plot areas will be front section, aft section, and engines with number three engine apart from other three. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Possible streak of departing door if sun angle and observers is aligned. (Just like TWA 800.) Aircraft will be a high time Boeing 747. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) : : So, Gentlemen entrusted with the public safety in aviation, you have not properly ruled out open cargo door inflight for TWA 800 because you have refused to discuss the explanation with the leading advocate and discoverer of it, that's me, as well as not having the required evidence such as a smooth cargo door and all ten latches to substantiate your reason for ruling it out as: : : Dr. Loeb of NTSB: "We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact." : : That statement above is absolutely false, full of errors, and a wrong conclusion. All claims are refuted by official documents and photographs which were emailed to you yesterday. : : Until you talk to me, you have not done your job of a complete aircraft accident investigation for TWA 800. And you know it after these long four years and hundreds of emails from me filled with facts such as analysis attached. I've included the analysis below to refute any accusation of weirdness, lack of research, faulty reasoning, and inaccuracy of facts presented by me. I'm not a missile guy or a bomb guy nor any conspiracy person. I'm the reasonable aviator who has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet crash and is saying that for several Boeing 747s, an event that happened before has happened again for TWA 800 and supports that plausible claim with extensive facts, data, and evidence. : : Until you face, consider, and thoroughly investigate the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800, you have failed. You have failed your duty as public safety officials to whom media, manufacturers, and citizens look toward for a complete investigation. You did not do a complete investigation. You did a specialized prosecution of center tank explosion. The wiring/cargo door explanation is still there, waiting for examination. And you know it. One exhibitin the Public docket and a sentence at a public hearing is not a complete investigation of a cause initially thought to the answer, forward cargo door opened in flight and ruled out within days based upon cursory examination of some but not all of the latches and some but not all of the cargo door. : : I again challenge you, as NTSB officials, as public safety officials, to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 by interacting with the proponent, the one who knows the most about it. If your mind is changed in some areas, then the better for it; if not changed, then you may rest that you have done a complete job of investigation and the better for it also. : : Sincerely, : : John Barry Smith : : (831) 659-3552 phone : : 551 Country Club Drive, : : Carmel Valley, CA 93924 : : www.corazon.com : : barry@corazon.com : : Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder. : : US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours. : : US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours. : : Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy : : Retired US Army Major MSC : : Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours. : : Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C : : NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report, : : Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996." : : Analysis by JBS> : : 1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine teardown facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton. : : 2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. A forensic powerplant teardown is likely to require several man hundred hours per engine with several thousand hours of metallographic back up work. Additionally many specialized tools are required to do this. There should be many thousands of feet of tape or pictures. Haste is evident in a one day teardown per engine in an empty hangar with only one engine specialist present. : : Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine (HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations." : : Analysis by JBS>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in this same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in this report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing and irregular FDR EPR readings. : : Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples which are mainly irrelevant in a discussion about engines and teardown results. 33% of engine report is not about engines but about favored NTSB explanation of center tank fuel explosion as initial event. : : Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward." : : Analysis by JBS>Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all' of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight. : : Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge. : : Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball. : : Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame. : : The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> : : The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing. : : Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at<http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html> Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears. : : The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals. : : It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim. : : The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath. : : This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white. : : Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another. : : The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41. : : The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows. : : The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area. : : The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup." : : The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular. : : The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT." : : The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces. : : Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report. : : "RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting : : RF3A-H These pieces are part of the : : forward main cargo door. : : Some have grimy corrosion : : inhibiting compound (CIC), but : : there is no apparent sooting. : : These pieces are part of the : : forward main cargo door. : : Some have grimy corrosion : : inhibiting compound (CIC), but : : there is no apparent sooting. : : RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting : : RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting : : RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting : : RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting : : RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting : : RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting : : RF8A No sooting No sooting : : RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting : : RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting : : RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting : : RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting : : RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting : : RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting : : RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting : : RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting" : : NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97 : : Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at : : <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight. : : The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." : : The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." : : NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information." : : The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB. : : The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me. : : Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony: : : 1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear : : 2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3 : : 3. inward crush top of cargo door : : 4. top of cargo door attached to hinge : : 5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch : : 6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches : : 7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side : : 8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door : : 9. hoop stresses found : : 10. CVR sudden loud sound : : 11. FDR abrupt power cut : : 12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3. : : 13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3. : : 14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area. : : 15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint : : 16. soot on most blades of engine 3. : : 17. starboard side more damaged than port side : : 18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door. : : 19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present : : 20. section 41 is known to be weak : : 21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners : : 22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight. : : 23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s. : : 24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side : : 25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks : : 26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area : : 27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing : : 28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments : : 29. initially thought to be a bomb : : 30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces : : 31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort : : 32. no soot on maintenance hatch : : 33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank : : 34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all : : 35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered : : 36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base : : 37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database : : 38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification : : 39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area : : 40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners : : 41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges. : : 42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing : : 43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing : : 44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing : : 45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted : : 46. aft cargo door sill is sooted : : 47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange : : 48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing. : : 49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion. : : 50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island. : : Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above: : : 1. water in forward cargo bay. : : 2. chafed bare wire touched by water. : : 3. electrical short occurs. : : 4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position. : : 5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches. : : 6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch. : : 7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't. : : 8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away. : : 9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR. : : 10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off. : : 11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire. : : 12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down. : : 13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank. : : 14. fireball observed on the ground. : : 15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water. : : Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800 : : John Barry Smith : : 11 Jan 98 : : Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff from hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch. : : The nine foot by nine foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. Fuselage skin was torn vertically. The door fractured and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above. : : The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder. : : At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer. : : The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane. : : The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin. : : The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast directly, leaving a wide debris field. : : Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris. : : Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out. : : Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion. : : Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

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