CIA Releases More Documents in Lahr Lawsuit
5-13-08 Release by CIA
(very large file)
Memos to/from Ray and John
June 8, 2008
Ray,
The CIA's error was intentional.
The most important issue on appeal is fraud.
The disclosure of which redactions in the packet would best
prove fraud?
My guess is that it's No. 5, about which you wrote:
Pages 41-50 contain 10 pages of mostly blank boxes. This
is representative of the non-cooperative attitude of the CIA. The
tantalizing titles on many of the boxes suggest that this is exactly the
type of information that we are seeking.
June 5, 2008
Hello John – Here is our basic response regarding the CIA
Production:
Thousands of eyewitnesses saw TWA800 explode and fall into the
ocean. This includes three airline crews and a National Guard crew. About two
hundred of the eyewitnesses saw a bright object streak towards TWA800 prior to
the initial explosion. The logical conclusion is that a missile initiated the
fuel tank explosion of TWA800. However, that wasn’t a politically acceptable
conclusion.
The CIA is not noted for aviation accident investigation
expertise, and it has no authority from Congress to play the lead role in the
determination of cause. Congress gave that authority to the NTSB. As soon as the
FBI and the CIA made a determination that criminality was not involved, those
agencies should have turned over the physical evidence that they had gathered,
and they should have withdrawn from the investigation.
Instead, a single CIA agent was sitting before his computer, and
he was seeking an explanation for the rising bright object seen by the
eyewitnesses. In a moment of inspiration, this agent hypothesized that the
object was TWA800 itself rising in an almost vertical climb trailing flames. The
scenario wasn’t plausible. In fact, it was aerodynamically impossible to fit
such a zoom-climb into all of the other evidence. But it was the only option
they had in order to steer the investigation from a missile to a mechanical
failure, a conclusion that was politically acceptable.
From that moment on, instead of following the evidence to its
logical conclusion, the zoom-climb conclusion was adopted and the evidence was
made to fit that
conclusion. Where the evidence simply didn’t fit that
conclusion, that evidence was withheld. The eyewitnesses were declared to be
mistaken, and not a single eyewitness was allowed to refute this declaration by
testifying at the public hearings. Ignoring eyewitnesses is unprecedented, and
withholding evidence borders on criminality. My focus is on one small portion of
the withheld evidence, namely, the data and calculations used for the impossible
zoom-climb.
In response to a court order, the CIA has released a new packet
of information. As with the previous information released by the CIA, it
provides no means of verifying the assumptions, the data, and the calculations
used by the CIA to produce its video animation of the zoom-climb. Somewhere, the
CIA has made a gross error, and the CIA seems determined to keep it hidden.
Presenting a conclusion without presenting the evidence violates the basic
precept of accident investigation and jurisprudent procedure.
1. This 130 page packet contains nine sections. The first
section refers to Mori DocID 1255554-A approved for release in May, 2008 (the
original Mori DocID 1255554 was approved for release in October, 2005). This
document attempts to discount the eyewitnesses on the basis of a zoom-climb, but
it does not present any evidence about how such a zoom-climb could have been
possible.
2. Pages 11 & 12 are labeled "Program to Analyze x,y Data from
Radars". This is not a program.
This is the very limited results of a program that transforms radar range and
azimuth coordinates to x,y coordinates. It is not difficult to write such a
program. The important thing is to release all of the raw radar data from all of
the radars that tracked TWA800 so that these results can either be verified or
disproved.
Pages 13 – 22 are hypothetical performance charts. Each chart
represents data and a formula probably entered into a computer, although they
could have been generated by hand. These charts are meaningless without the data
and formulas. Furthermore, they represent a performance that was aerodynamically
impossible. Where are the data and formulas that went into these charts?
3. Page 23 is an important page. It acknowledges the range of
speculation and the huge discrepancies between assumptions made by the CIA and
Boeing. In order to hypothesize a zoom-climb, both the CIA and Boeing had to
make unrealistic assumptions about the noseless aircraft. Both the CIA and
Boeing refuse to release the assumptions that went into their calculations. Both
had to assume that the aircraft remained symmetrically balanced, gravitationally
balanced, control surface balanced, and engine power balanced in order continue
to fly. None of these assumptions are realistic. The good eyewitnesses saw the
major parts of the aircraft fall downwards out of the initial explosion in two
flaming streams.
4. Pages 25 – 39 comprise Mori DocID 1215200-A. They are
certainly more extensive than the six pages in the original MoriDoc 1215200.
However, they still share the same basic fault, namely, no input data and no
formulas. There is no way to verify or disprove these claimed results.
5. Pages 41-50 contain 10 pages of mostly blank boxes. This is
representative of the non-cooperative attitude of the CIA. The tantalizing
titles on many of the boxes suggest that this is exactly the type of information
that we are seeking.
6. Pages 51 – 67 are another 17 pages of mostly blank boxes.
However, the radar hits on page 67 are useful and hopefully can be checked
against the portion of radar data that has been previously released.
7. Pages 69 – 90 start off with the "view from the bridge". This
refers to the view described by Michael Wire, the millwright who was working on
the bridge. His description featured prominently in the CIA video. Michael Wire
flatly rejects that CIA representation of his testimony. There was no zoom-climb
observed from the bridge.
Once again, there was no data or formulas provided to verify or
disprove the conclusions represented on the charts that followed Michael Wire’s
description.
8. Pages 92 -119 and Pages 122 – 128 appear to be the results of
a computer run. Now if we could just get the data and formulas used for this
run, we could probably find where they made their mistake or false assumption.
9. Page 130 was denied in full on the first release. This time
we are provided a preliminary run to show the variation due to thrust. There
seems to be an implicit assumption that the engine thrust remained balanced
across all four engines, even though the location of the engines in the debris
field was widely scattered. That indicates that engine thrust did not remain
balanced. If one or more engines quit before the others, there would have been a
violent yaw that would immediately have upset the aircraft since there was no
cockpit and there was no way to introduce control inputs which might counteract
the yaw.
In summary, the CIA acknowledges that the zoom-climb was
conceived in an attempt to explain the rising bright streak observed by about
200 eyewitnesses. However, the CIA refuses to reveal the data and calculations
used to support that conception. Once again, presenting a conclusion without
presenting the evidence violates the basic precept of accident investigation and
jurisprudent procedure.
|
5-13-08 Production Pages
|
Pl Rec No
|
Pl Vol & Bates pages
|
MORI Number
|
Alternate MORI Number
|
Number of Pages
|
|
1
|
4-9
|
12
|
III at 692-697
|
1255554 —A
|
1186298
|
6
|
|
2
|
11-21
|
56
|
IV at 891-893
|
1305302 —A
|
1147390
|
11
|
|
3
|
23
|
13
|
III at 700
|
1215017 —A
|
1186300
|
1
|
|
4
|
25-39
|
45
|
III at 808-813
|
1215200 -A
|
1147343
|
15
|
|
5
|
41-50
|
27
|
III at 733-734
|
1215195 -A
|
1147320
|
10
|
|
6
|
51-67
|
28
|
III at 735-736
|
1215194 -A
|
1147319
|
17
|
|
7
|
69-90
|
29
|
III at 737-738
|
1215196 -A
|
1147321
|
22
|
|
8
|
92-119
|
32
|
III at 741-768
|
1215202 -A;
|
1147405
|
27
|
|
122-128
|
32
|
Same as above
|
1215202 -B
|
7
|
|
9
|
130
|
46
|
III at 814
|
1215209 -A
|
1147407
|
1
|
